![]() The United States SAFEGUARD ABM program was, at least on paper, much moreĪmbitious and capable than its Soviet counterpart, and was designed to encompass up Of the nuclear equation, the Soviet Union had deployed a limited ABM system around Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). It had programs under way to increase substantially its total warhead count by deploying Had essentially frozen the number of its strategic missiles, submarines, and bombers, Land-based missiles, even in heavily protected launch sites. The huge payload capacity of these heavy ICBMs was seen as a possible threat to U.S. Or heavy, ICBMs, as well as their submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers. Their intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, particularly their largest, To be “strategic” weapons, as well as the difficulties in coming to grips with theĪsymmetries between the two nuclear arsenals. Preliminary discussions revealed wide differences in what each side considered The talks alternatedīetween Helsinki and Vienna, with each session lasting for several months, followedīy a break. The Kremlin would thereby be encouraged to refrain from global adventurismĪnd from exploiting nationalist movements, which threatened to undermine the overallīalance of power and heighten U.S.–Soviet confrontation and conflict.įormal negotiations on SALT began in Helsinki on 17 November 1969. Was to provide Soviet leadership with a compelling stake in a peaceful superpower The nuclear balance and remove incentives for continued competition in strategic weapons.īut the ultimate purpose of SALT, along with other agreements with the Soviet Union, The immediate objective of arms control was to stabilize The Nixon White House viewed SALT as a tactical ingredient in that strategy,Īnd not as an end in itself. None of the Nixon recordings concerning SALT refer to the term “détente.” The Nixon–KissingerĬonception of détente meant negotiating spheres of stability with the Soviets (and Of containing communism, and was a somewhat nebulous phenomenon throughout the period Détente represented an evolutionary stage in the U.S. Kissinger,īegan to incorporate possible strategic arms control options into a broad strategy Policy adviser, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. When President Nixon entered the White House in January 1969, he and his chief foreign ![]() Political fallout over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The proposed talks were never held, however, due to the In 1967, and Johnson announced in July 1968 that they had agreed to begin discussions The two nations discussed the subject conceptually at the Glassboro summit SALT I, as the two agreements became known collectively in the political and armsĬontrol lexicon, originated in the last years of the administration of President Lyndonī. To achieve an offensive-defensive linkage that would halt Soviet nuclear modernizationĮfforts and simultaneously restrict the development and deployment of anti-ballistic The combined SALT agreements culminated a three-year effort by the Nixon administration Was a treaty of unlimited duration that restricted anti-ballistic missile systems The first was an interim executive agreement that froze certainĬategories of strategic nuclear offensive forces for a five-year period. Two agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the strategicĪrms limitation talks (SALT) that spanned the first administration of President Richard Repetitive, and the selections provided here are representative of the larger corpus. Like Nixon’s recordings on many other topics, the SALT conversations are highly A list of the additional conversations isįound in Appendix 1. Those conversations are transcribed here. Between 16 FebruaryĪnd, President Nixon secretly recorded approximately 100 conversationsĭuring which he and his advisers discussed SALT in a substantive way. The first SALT-related conversation in the Nixon White House recordings occurred onġ6 February 1971, the first day of operation for the taping system. The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of theĪuthors, and do not represent those of the U.S. Department of Defense Go to the Nixon Arms Control recordings Mahan, Non-Resident Research Fellow, Presidential Recordings Program, Miller Center Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Garrity, Research Fellow, Presidential Recordings Program, Miller Center, University of VirginiaĮrin R. Nixon and Arms Control Forging the Offensive/Defensive Link in the SALT Negotiations,
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